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This paper examines a general problem exempli¯ed by post-auction (third
generation|`3G') mobile telecommunications markets. When entering these (or
any other) markets, ¯rms must often decide on the degree of coverage (`roll-out')
they wish to achieve. Prior investment must be sunk in order to achieve the
desired (or mandated) coverage level. We study the private and social incen-
tives of a would-be entrant into a market with horizontal product di®erentiation
when choosing its level of roll-out. The endogenous extent of entry in°uences
downstream retail prices; Bertrand or local monopoly pricing or a mixed strategy
equilibrium may emerge. Importantly, entry may involve too much or too little
roll-out from a social perspective, thus suggesting that regulatory intervention
may be appropriate to achieve desired levels of competition in such settings.
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own.1 Introduction
This paper examines a general problem exempli¯ed by post-auction (third generation|
`3G') mobile telecommunications markets. A potential entrant to these (or other) mar-
kets must make a variety of decisions. Where to locate in product space and what price
to charge are two examples. Issues of location and pricing in horizontally and verti-
cally di®erentiated markets have received considerable attention (see e.g. Beath and
Katsoulakos (1991)). This paper is about another decision faced by potential entrants:
their level of market coverage. Entry decisions in models of product di®erentiation are
typically modelled as involving an exogenously ¯xed cost, with resulting market shares
arising as the result of post-entry competition. Yet they will also be determined by the
extent of entry by the new ¯rm|by the amount of the market it chooses to cover.
It is easy to think of situations where a ¯rm might make a roll-out decision prior to
entry. However, some interesting recent examples can be found in utilities regulation:
in particular in telecommunications. Thus, in the UK, following the granting of a
¯fth licence for UMTS (3G) mobile operation following spectrum auctions in 2000,
the winner (TIW UMTS (UK)) must now decide how fast to roll out its network.
Although it faces externally-set targets here, the interim decisions on coverage are its
own. Similar issues face post-auction entrants in other countries. Another example can
be found in UK postal services, where the regulator (Postcomm) has recently licenced
Hays plc to compete with the incumbent monopolist Consignia. Hays have agreed
short-term coverage levels. Another company (Deya) is reportedly keen to enter this
market with di®erent coverage levels (100%). The fact that, in all these cases, the
entrants have stressed the di®erentiated nature of their product, relative to incumbent
facilities, makes them strong examples of the issues our paper aims to address.
Apart from the privately optimal level of coverage for an entrant into a di®eren-
tiated market, these examples raise another question: what is the socially optimal
level of coverage? Perhaps the entrant will opt for low coverage in order to relax
downstream price competition, but this may not satisfy regulatory preferences. In the
above examples, this question relates to the universal service obligations present in
both telecommunications and postal services (see Cremer et al. (2001)). We therefore
seek to compare the socially and privately optimal levels of coverage.
A variety of authors have looked at issues relating to our work. Thus, Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) and Davidson and Deneckere (1986), look at existing duopolists'
capacity decisions in advance of Bertrand pricing games. In each case, they deal with
homogeneous products and established competitors. Similarly, Valletti et al. (2001)
asks about the optimality of universal service obligations when output is homoge-
neous. Dixit (1980) looks at an incumbent's capacity decision in advance of a potential
entrant's arrival and the prospect of Cournot competition with homogeneous outputs.
1It is interesting that, in our paper, the entrant has the ability (through its roll-out
decision) to in°uence the downstream retail price equilibrium (as Dixit's incumbent
can). Other authors have looked at entry decisions with di®erentiated products, where
the scale (and cost) of entry is ¯xed (see Beath and Katsoulakos (1991)). Prescott and
Visscher (1977) and Mason and Weeds (2000) extend these models to look at the tim-
ing of entry (or of product introduction). Several authors have examined incentives for
investment in telecommunications markets with exogenous entry costs (see Wildman
(1997), Gans and Williams (1999), Carter and Wright (1999)). La®ont et al. (1998a)
discuss the problem we consider below, but do not solve it. They indicate how market
coverage may be modelled and describe the two-stage game we study, but they do not
derive the variety of potential equilibria or compare this with a benevolent regulator's
choice of coverage.1
The paper proceeds as follows. The main part is divided into two sections aimed
at analysing markets with inelastic and elastic consumer demands. In Section 2, we
examine a variant of a simple Hotelling model, in which consumers have unit demands.
This limiting case of inelastic demands is convenient because it has a well-de¯ned
monopoly solution. In order to address the question of roll-out, we imagine the total
market as a unit square and assume that price competition takes place on that portion
of the square the entrant chooses to cover. In this way, we endogenise the entry cost
and give entry a geographical interpretation. Here we identify three downstream price
equilibria: two in pure strategies (Bertrand competition and `local monopoly', where
each ¯rm behaves as a standard monopolist within its market area) and one in mixed
strategies. Restricting ourselves to situations where a pure strategy equilibrium exists,
we show that the entrant will never invest beyond that level which guarantees local
monopoly, where both entrant and incumbent tacitly collude on market share. We
show that this level of entry will never be socially optimal: the regulator will either
wish for su±cient entry to stimulate price competition, or none at all (because entry
costs are too great).
Section 3 relaxes the assumption of unit (inelastic) demands and examines the case
of elastic demands. We cannot derive closed form solutions for this case, but simula-
tions illustrate several important e®ects of these more elastic demands. In particular,
the entrant may now invest su±ciently for price competition to take place because,
depending on the relative elasticities for the two products, this may stimulate inroads
into the incumbent's market. Again, regulatory preferences may di®er from this re-
sult, with excessive or insu±cient roll-out taking place. Section 4 concludes the paper,
and considers what our results mean for the need to include coverage targets when
1In general, Armstrong (2001), p. 67, observes that modelling investment in network industries is
an important next step for literature in this area.
2regulators allow new entry into geographical markets.
2 The model with inelastic demands
2.1 Market coverage
The market consists of a unit square, corresponding to a geographcal area (see Fig-
ure 1). Consumers are uniformly distributed across the square and, in particular, on
[0;1] along every horizontal axis in the square (each axis therefore forms a sub-market
corresponding to a Hotelling model of horizontal product di®erentiation). Firm 1 (the
incumbent) is situated (exogenously) at point 0 in each of these sub-markets and, by
assumption, already covers the whole geographical market. Firm 2 (the entrant) must
decide whether to enter (at point 1 in each of the sub-markets) and what proportion
of the total market to cover (the value of ¹ in Figure 1). If entry takes place, the ¯rms
compete for market share within the common sub-markets with ® (to be determined)
of each market segment going to Firm 1; the incumbent retains a monopoly in the
remaining 1 ¡ ¹ of the market. Thus, we envisage a two-stage process where Firm 2
chooses its level of coverage (¹), then price competition takes place (determining ®).
Clearly, ¹ = 1 corresponds to universal competition.
Figure 1: The market square
We derive the shares in each sub-market in the conventional way. In a representative
sub-market, consumers derive a gross surplus of s when consuming from either ¯rm
and have (for now) unit demands (they buy `one or none'). As mentioned earlier, this
case can be thought of as the limit when elasticities tend to zero (and consumers have a
3maximum willingness to pay, s). Its advantage over other inelastic cases is that it has a
well-de¯ned monopoly price so we can allow for a variety of possible market outcomes.
Consider a consumer at point x 2 [0;1] on the horizontal axis. Then the net surplus
when consuming from Firm 1 (located at x = 0) at price p1 is s ¡ p1 ¡ tx, while that
from Firm 2's product is s ¡ p2 ¡ t(1 ¡ x); t is the transport (or `utility') cost of
consuming away from the supplier. Market shares at x = ® (if both ¯rms can service
the whole sub-market) are found from the indi®erence condition:
s ¡ p1 ¡ t® = s ¡ p2 ¡ t(1 ¡ ®)







Thus, Firm 1's market share in the contested region is ® and Firm 2's is 1¡® (assuming
full coverage in this sub-market), as in Figure 1. Then, given Firm 2's initial coverage
decision (¹), the respective shares for Firm 1 (the incumbent) and Firm 2 (the entrant)
become
®1 =1¡ ¹(1 ¡ ®);® 2 = ¹(1 ¡ ®)
We assume that investment is costly to the entrant, with the cost function being
d(¹)=°¹2=2;°> 0. Each unit produced has marginal cost of c.2
2.2 Retail prices
The ¯rms play a two-stage game in which the entrant ¯rst sets ¹, then price competition
ensues in the retail market.3 We therefore solve by backwards induction, beginning with
prices conditional on ¹. Pro¯t functions for ® ¸ 0 (post-investment) are
¼1 =( p1 ¡ c)[1¡ ¹(1 ¡ ®)];¼ 2 =( p2 ¡ c)¹(1 ¡ ®) (2)












(t + c + p1) (3)
2Thus, our assumption that Firm 1 will cover the whole market in the absence of competition is
equivalent to s ¸ c +2 t. To see this, note that an incumbent monopolist would choose market share
¯ to solve max¯ ¼1 =( s ¡ t¯ ¡ c)¯. The solution ¯ =( s ¡ c)=2t ¸ 1 if the above inequality holds.
3For convenience, we restrict attention linear pricing, with no third-degree price discrimination
(either along a given sub-market or across the incumbent's monopoly and non-monopoly markets). In
this respect, our analysis departs from common practice in the telecommunications sector, although
it is representative of many other settings. See Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992), La®ont et al. (1998a)
and La®ont et al. (1998b) for examples relaxing these assumptions on a conventional `Hotelling line'.




















Notice that, when ¹ = 1, we have pB
1 = pB
2 = t + c, i.e. marginal cost pricing with the
¯rms also able to exploit the transport cost that provide an element of market power.
Also pB
2 <p B













Thus, a larger entrant generates more price competition and pushes down retail prices.
Pro¯t functions (2) hold for ® ¸ 0. However, the retail prices may be such that
this cannot be guaranteed so we must allow for the possibility of local monopoly as







This condition may not hold because the entrant undercuts the incumbent in Bertrand

















and thus ® 2 (0; 1
2] for ¹ 2 (0:4; 1]. Then, for investment levels ¹ 2 (0; 0:4], the
¯rms have the prospect of behaving as local monopolies, able to charge their monopoly
prices (assuming full coverage of their own market segments):
p
M
1 = s ¡ t; p
M
2 = s ¡ t (8)
In fact, the prospect of a local monopoly equilibrium needs closer examination. If
Firm 2 chooses pM
2 , it may be pro¯table for Firm 1 to deviate from pM
1 in order to
make inroads into 2's market share. In this case, Bertrand equilibrium should be the
result but with ¹<0:4 we know that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium on the reaction
functions cannot exist. Accordingly, we need to establish two things. First, what is the
4This undercutting result can also be found in La®ont et al. (1998a).
5retail equilibrium if a pro¯table deviation away from pM
1 is available to the incumbent?
Second, what condition(s) characterise which of the possible equilibria will prevail?
As we have no Bertrand equilibrium for ¹<0:4, when Firm 1 deviates from pM
1
the entrant needs to ¯nd a lower price (than pM
2 ) to maintain its local monopoly over
¹. This is the `limit price', pL
2: the lowest price that makes the consumers who have
the choice of buying from either of the two ¯rms and who are located furthest from
the entrant, indi®erent between buying from the incumbent or the entrant; i.e.
s ¡ p1(p
L













t + c (9)






t + c (10)
We now ask whether this is the best price that Firm 2 can charge. Clearly it is
not because, given a local monopoly, it would rather charge its full monopoly price
pM
2 . However, it can only do this if Firm 1 is prepared to set pM
1 . When will this
happen? A convenient way to approach this is to compare pM
1 with p1(pM
2 ). If we have
pM
1 <p 1(pM
2 ) then Firm 1 will set pM
1 by de¯nition of its monopoly price (given ¹).
Alternatively, if we have pM
1 >p 1(pM
2 ) then by de¯nition of Firm 1's best response
function, it must gain by deviating from pM
1 (after all, pM
1 is one possible response to
pM









2 into (3) to give p1(pM
2 ) and compare this with pM
1 . Next, note
that if the inequality holds for ¹ =0 :4 (the level of coverage at which local monopoly
becomes a possibility) it also holds for lesser coverage levels. Q.E.D.
Thus, when ¹<¹, a local monopoly pure strategy equilibrium fpM
1 ;p M
2 g exists.
Note that ¹>0i fs>c , which is ensured by our assumption that s ¸ c +2 t. Further
¹<0:4i fs>c+5 t, which is stronger than our assumption.
We can now state our ¯rst result:
Result 1 For ¹ 2 [0; 0:4], when (6) holds (i.e. ¹<¹) , the retail equilibrium
(conditional on ¹)i sfpM
1 ;p M
2 g.F o r¹ 2 (0:4;1], the retail equilibrium is fpB
1 ;p B
2 g.
6We now consider what happens when ¹ 2 (¹; 0:4), should this range exist. One
possibility here might be a `commitment equilibrium' where the entrant commits to
charging pL
2, so the incumbent sets pM
1 . However, in the absence of any credible com-
mitment mechanism for the entrant, it would wish to respond to this by setting pM
2 .
Yet Firm 1's best response to this is p1(pM
2 )|given ¹<0:4|and Firm 2 then re-
grets setting pM
2 . Thus, the commitment equilibrium breaks down. We can, however,
demonstrate the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for this case, as the
following result proves.
Result 2 For ¹ 2 (¹; 0:4), should this range exist, there exists a mixed strategy
equilibrium in retail prices, consisiting of strategies: Firm 1 plays pM
1 with probabil-
ity x¤ 2 (0;1) and p1(pM
2 ) with probability 1 ¡ x¤; Firm 2 plays pM
2 with probability
y¤ 2 (0;1) and pL
2 with probability 1 ¡ y¤.
Proof See Appendix.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate these results. The relationships depicted are easily derived
from (4) and (8).
Figure 2: p2 when s>c+5 t Figure 3: p2 when c +2 t<s<c+5 t
Hence, in the case where the two ¯rms assume full coverage of their own market
segments, they will either choose local monopoly prices or, if a pro¯table deviation
from this is available to Firm 1, price competition will be `too severe' to produce a
pure strategy equilibrium. Lemma 1 tells us that the incumbent will be happy to
charge its monopoly price provided the entrant is su±ciently small|there is not much
market share to attract from the entrant. `Smallness' here is determined by t and s¡c.
When t is high, so the two ¯rms' products are not very substitutable, there is little to
7be gained from price competition to attract custom and the incumbent is prepared to
set pM
1 . Similarly, when the net surplus from attracting another customer (s ¡ c)i s
low, this also deters competitive behaviour by the incumbent.
2.3 Investment
For the remainder of this section, we restrict attention to c +2 t<s<c+5 t and thus
rule out the complexities of a mixed strategy equilibrium.
We ¯rst ask the question of whether the entrant will want to compete with the
incumbent ¯rm.5 To consider this, we begin by calculating the reduced-form pro¯t


















Using this, we can derive our second result:
Result 3 The entrant never invests beyond ¹ =0 :4.








¹2 ¡ °¹ =
t
18
(¹ ¡ 2)(2 + ¹)
¹2 ¡ °¹ < 0 8¹ 2 [0;1]
Thus, the entrant prefers as little investment as possible in the presence of price com-
petition. In particular, it will not want to invest past the local monopoly level. Q.E.D.
We now need to know whether the entrant chooses to invest as far as ¹ =0 :4.















= s ¡ t ¡ c ¡ °¹
¤ ¸ 0 ) ¹
¤ ·
s ¡ c ¡ t
°
(14)
where the inequality holds at the boundary ¹¤ =0 :4. We can now state a result
characterizing the entrant's choice of coverage and the type of retail equilibrium that
will prevail in the market6:
5The entrant behaves in analogous fashion to the incumbent in Dixit (1980): investment in the
current period takes place in anticipation of its e®ect on the subsequent market game.
6To reiterate, we are assuming c +5 t>s ¸ c +2 t>c+ t throughout.






2 (0; 0:4] when s¡c¡t
° < 0:4
The only retail equilibrium involves local monopoly prices.
Proof This follows ¯rst from (14). We must check that ¼M
2 (¹¤) > 0 when ¹¤ < 0:4
and that ¼M




2° > 0. Further, placing ¹ =0 :4 in (13) gives ¼M
2 (0:4) = s¡c¡t¡0:08°. This
is clearly positive when ¹¤ > 0:4. Finally, we also need to check that ¼M
2 (¹¤) >¼ B
2 (0:4).
Clearly, this is true since ¼M
2 (¹¤) ¸ ¼M
2 (0:4) ¸ ¼B
2 (0:4): the ¯rst inequality holds by
de¯nition of ¹¤ and the second holds by de¯nition of monopoly prices. Q.E.D.
Result 4 tells us that the entrant may be willing to give up market share (i.e. restrict
its local monopoly area) if the costs of investment are too high. Factors that increase
¹¤ are listed as follows:
Result 5 Investment rises towards ¹¤ =0 :4 as s rises and c;t and ° fall, ceteris
paribus.
Proof Di®erentiating (14) gives each of these. Q.E.D.
Clearly, factors that increase the monopoly price or margin, ceteris paribus, make
extra investment (and local market share) worthwhile, while an increase in the cost
of investment has the opposite e®ect. For this reason, products with high consumer
value (s) raise ¹¤. Similarly, projects that are highly capital-intensive or geographically
di±cult to build (two interpretations of high °) reduce investment in coverage, as does
signi¯cant product di®erentiation (high t), where monopoly power is less needed.
2.4 Regulator's investment choice
The regulator seeks to maximize the sum of consumers' expected surplus plus industry
pro¯t net of investment costs.7 In fact, the unit demands of the current framework
mean that she is not worried about price (there are no deadweight losses), but does
care about the expected transport costs faced by consumers|see Tirole (1988).
7We assume that the regulator does not directly choose prices, an assumption mirrored by the
current plans for 3G mobile telecommunications. Also, note that we solve the regulator's problem
without the ¯rms' zero pro¯t constraints that would usually accompany the regulator's problem; we
check these are in fact satis¯ed for our subsequent simulations.
9Once the regulator has chosen (and enforced) a level of investment, Result 1 tells us
the resulting price equilibrium, given ¹>0:4. Thus, we must examine the regulator's
welfare function across the local monopoly and Bertrand equilibria. In the ¯rst of these
cases, we have
W







Clearly, this means that the regulator will choose ¹M
R = 0 whenever a monopoly equi-
librium would arise from encouraging entry. The reasoning is straightforward: since
(monopoly) prices are of no interest to the regulator, her chief concern is to economise
on investment costs.
Now assume that the regulator chooses ¹R > 0:4 (call this ¹B
R) so that a Bertrand
equilibrium would result. Welfare is now
W














Why might the regulator choose such an investment level? Although investment costs
are incurred, there is now the prospect that investment will push down prices and lower
®, thereby reducing expected transport costs. This channel was not available under
monopoly, where ® = 0 by de¯nition.












(where we have used ¹M
R = 0 and 1¡®2¡(1¡®)2 =2 ®(1¡®)). Notice that maximising
¢W is equivalent to maximising W B; we work with the former. Straightaway we see
that since ¹B
R =0 :4 ) ® = 0, we have ¢W(0:4) < 0: the regulator will never set
¹B
R =0 :4. Further, it is easy to show that any positive choice of ¹B
R will be unique
since ¢W(¹) is concave.8
Combining our observations so far with Result 4, we have
8 We have the ¯rst order condition
@¢W
@¹




(1 ¡ 2®) ¡ °¹B




R)2 (from (7)). Notice that both of the ¯rst terms are positive here, the second as a
result of ® · 1
2. The second order condition is
@2¢W
@¹2 = t®0(1 ¡ ®) ¡ t®®0 +
·
3¹B









where we have again used @®
@¹ = 1
3(¹B
R)2 to get to the last line. Thus, if (16) has an interior maximum,
it is unique. A corner solution (at ¹B
R = 1) will obviously be unique.
10Result 6 Whenever the regulator chooses positive investment, this will involve ¹B
R >
0:4 and Firm 2's independent choice of coverage will be too low (since it is never above
0.4). Whenever the regulator chooses zero coverage, Firm 2's choice will be too high.
From (15), note that ¢W(1) = 1
2[ t
2 ¡ °] (since ® = 1
2 when ¹ = 1) . Hence, a
su±cient condition to ensure that the regulator chooses ¹>0:4 (so that the entrant's
choice implies under-investment) is t
2 >° . Thus, the prospects of (some) coverage
being socially optimal increase with transport costs (t) and decrease with investment
costs (°)|both of these are intuitive. Further, we can say that full coverage (¹ =1 ,
i.e. `universal service' ) is socially optimal if ¢W 0(¹) > 0;8¹ 2 (0:4;1].
Next, suppose that ¹B
R is an interior solution to (16). Then we can use the implicit
function theorem on (16) to perform comparative statics. In particular, because s and



























the ¯rst inequality being due to ® · 1
2 (recall (7)). Thus, again, the regulator prefers
greater coverage as `transport costs' grow and as investment costs fall.
How does the entrant's investment choice compare with that of the regulator? Fig-
ures 4 and 5 indicate this by plotting both parties' optimal coverage as t and ° change
respectively.9 Figure 4 shows that, for our parameter values, Firm 2 enters the market
but at too low a level for the regulator, who prefers a Bertrand equilibrium: there is
under-investment. As t rises, the e®ect on expected transport costs leads the regulator
to prefer increasingly extensive roll-out (see (17)). Accordingly, Firm 2's roll-out is
increasingly sub-optimal.
Now consider Figure 5. For very low values of the investment cost parameter (°)
the regulator chooses over 50% market coverage for Firm 2 (and Bertrand equilibrium),
but the ¯rm prefers its maximum 40% coverage. As investment costs rise, however,
the regulator prefers no entry (see (18)), and Firm 2's entry decision becomes one with
over-investment. As ° increases past 8, the entrant gradually lowers its coverage level
9Our baseline parameters are s =5 ;c=0 :5;t=1 ;°= 1; hence, s>c+2 t and ¹>0:4. For
convenience, the ¯gures denote the regulator's choice of investment by ¹R regardless of whether a
Bertrand or local monopoly equilibrium occurs.















Figure 4: Changes in transport
costs (t) with unit demands













Figure 5: Changes in investment
cost (°) with unit demands
(s¡c¡t
° =0 :38 < 0:4 when ° = 9). As the investment cost parameter continues to
rise, ¹¤ falls and the level of over-investment decreases (in the limit, ¹¤ ! ¹B
R =0a s
° !1 ).
Figures 4 and 5 con¯rm Result 6 and make an important point that is worth
summarising as follows:
Result 7 It is possible for the entrant to engage in excessive roll-out (over-investment)
or insu±cient roll-out (under-investment) from a social perspective. Either case implies
a role for regulation in entrants' roll-out decisions.
3 Elastic demands
The assumption of unit demands is a convenient way to model inelastic demands when
monopoly equilibria may be of interest, as we have said. However, it will not always be
realistic. Further, there are reasons to believe that increasingly elastic demands may
in°uence our results. For example, unit demands may be responsible for the entrant's
incentive to avoid Bertrand competition: unit demands limit the gains available from
heavy investment which pushes down prices. Similarly, the regulator's ambivalence
towards the direct price e®ects of investment (as opposed to the indirect e®ects on
transport costs through ®) hinges on the unit demands assumption. Thus, it seems
important to investigate the e®ects of more elastic demands.10
10La®ont et al. (1998a) and Armstrong (1998) both suggest that an existence problem may arise
in the pricing equilibrium game when elastic demands are present. The reason involves the interplay
12We retain our earlier framework but, instead of s ¡ pi, we assume a representative









= ¡qi;q i = p
¡´i
i ;i =1 ;2
In order to allow for the possibility of monopoly prices, it is necessary to assume that






v(^ p1) ¡ v(^ p2)
2t
(19)
so that market shares are ^ ®1 =1¡ ^ ¹(1 ¡ ^ ®) and ^ ®2 =^ ¹(1 ¡ ^ ®). The new pro¯t
functions are
^ ¼1 =(^ p1 ¡ c)[1 ¡ ^ ¹(1 ¡ ^ ®)]^ q1; ^ ¼2 =(^ p2 ¡ c)^ ¹(1 ¡ ^ ®)^ q2























It is readily apparent that, in general, these are highly non-linear with no straightfor-
ward closed-form solution. For our purposes, this presents no great problem because we
seek to illustrate signi¯cant changes brought about by moving to more elastic demands.
We do this by numerical examples.









In fact monopoly situations will arise when the above is reversed. Clearly, we can no
longer say that this inequality will be satis¯ed by ^ ¹ ¸ 0:4. In such cases, we should

















We again restrict attention to parameter values for which ^ pM
1 < ^ p1(^ pM
1 ), where ^ pM
1
between retail prices and interconnection charges (both papers model two-way access in telecommu-
nications, something not in our model).
13is implicitly de¯ned using (20), reducing the equilibria to either local monopoly or
Bertrand. Investment decisions can be characterised as before. Analysis of the various
pro¯t functions makes clear that we can no longer rule out a Bertrand equilibrium
since the entrant's Bertrand pro¯t function need not be monotonically decreasing in
^ ¹. This may con¯rm our earlier intuition: it may be possible to ¯nd examples where
the entrant chooses to compete under more elastic demands.
Now consider the regulator's welfare function. For monopoly and Bertrand equilib-
ria respectively, we have
^ W
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Figures 6{9 illustrate several features of the equilibria that may now emerge, main-
taining the same baseline parameters as before, with the addition that ´1 = ´2 =1 :5.
The ¯rst thing to note about all the ¯gures is that, now, ^ ®>0 in all cases: as suggested
earlier, more elastic demands make price competition more attractive to the entrant
because of the extra responsiveness to demand that they imply.11 This observation is
illustrated (for changes in t) in Figure 6. An interesting feature of Figure 6 is that
higher values of t cause the entrant and the regulator to lower ^ ®|i.e. to raise the
entrant's market share in those areas where it rolls out its service. This is achieved
by lower retail prices (unlike in (4), where less substitutable products raise Bertrand
prices). The reason is that elastic demands can cause higher transport costs to push
down ¯rms' sales even if they do not lose custom (with unit demands, no custom is
lost when t changes|see (7)|and each consumer's purchases remain the same, by
de¯nition). Thus, the ¯rms now have an incentive to lower price even though they
appear to have less need to compete with each other.
Figure 7 demonstrates the e®ects of changes in t on the entrant's roll-out decision
and that of the regulator: both involve lower roll-out as t rises. Both are in°uenced
here by the above argument that higher transport costs can (and in the current case
do) push down retail prices and increase the entrant's market share. Thus, both have
11As a result of this, our ¯gures now relate to a di®erent market structure than Figures 4 and 5.
Hence, the two sets of ¯gures are not directly comparable.
14an incentive to economise on entry costs by lowering ^ ¹. The regulator is also worried
about the direct e®ect of transport costs, however, and this accounts for her lower
curve in Figure 7. In order to reduce expected transport costs, she needs to lower ^ ®.




















(^ q2 ¡ ^ q1) > 0
Although we cannot con¯rm that the above assumptions hold generally, numerical so-
lutions con¯rm that they hold for the current range of parameter values. Thus, the
regulator economises on transport costs by reducing entrant roll-out and increasing its
share in the contested market segment. The entrant does not internalise this external-
ity.12
















Figure 6: Contested market shares
with elastic demands














Figure 7: Changes in transport
costs (t) with elastic demands
Figure 8 shows that desired coverage falls for both regulator and ¯rm as invest-
ment costs (°) rise, with both over-investment (for low °) then under-investment (for
high °) taking place. Figure 9 considers the e®ects of one of the elasticity parameters
introduced in this section, ´2. It shows that increases in the entrant's elasticity of
demand reduce coverage for both itself and the regulator; with excessive roll-out oc-
12These arguments seem unlikely to hold in general. For instance, at some point, one would expect
the regulator's concern for transport costs in the 1 ¡ ^ ¹ segment to dominate as ^ ¹ falls.
15curring over the range we select. The negative slopes re°ect that fact that more elastic
demands sharpen price competition and, therefore, permit a reduction in investment
costs while still allowing reasonable market share (for the entrant) and low prices (for
the regulator).

















Figure 8: Changes in investment
cost (°) with elastic demands
















Figure 9: Changes in the entrant's
elasticity of demand (´2)
We ¯nish this section by stating its main ¯nding:
Result 8 When demands are elastic, the entrant may be prepared to invest in su±cient
roll-out to generate Bertrand price competition. Relative to the social optimum, both
under-investment and over-investment can occur.
4 Conclusions and further work
We have amended the standard Hotelling framework to allow an interpretation of geo-
graphical coverage and to endogenise a ¯rm's costs of entry into this market, dependent
on it chosen level of coverage. We ¯nd entry can result in several possible pricing equi-
libria. Which in fact arises is sensitive to the structure of consumer demands. With
unit demands (or, perhaps more generally, relatively inelastic demands) entry will only
take place when the entrant and incumbent tacitly collude to produce a local monopoly,
with both ¯rms charging normal monopoly prices, or (possibly) with a mixed strategy
equilibrium involving local monopoly and limit pricing. Relatively elastic demands,
however, make Bertrand competition more likely, because they encourage the entrant
to enter and price away the incumbent's business. In both cases, the entrant's scale of
entry may be too large or too small from a social perspective.
16Two general, opposing, e®ects govern this result. Investment involves duplication
of facilities which suggests that over-investment may occur. However, it also increases
competition and can lower prices (and expected transport costs), which is bene¯cial
for consumers/regulators but not for ¯rms; this may induce under-investment. The
total impact of these e®ects on actual private investment depends, as we have shown,
on the nature of demands and the costs of investment.
Our results suggest that it may be inappropriate for regulators to leave the market to
determine investment levels by a new entrant (as is the case in, say, the 3G mobile phone
context). If contractual clauses regarding roll-out are to be enforced, the regulator
needs credible sanctions to encourage the entrant to abide by these. Further, to the
extent that aspects of roll-out are non-veri¯able/non-contractible, our results suggest
that unregulated roll-out may not achieve ¯rst-best levels of coverage. Depending on
the properties of consumer demands, our results also suggest that downstream pricing
may be less competitive than the entry of a second ¯rm might suggest. Thus, the idea
(implicit in the plans for regulating 3G mobile operators) that downstream competition
may push retail prices down needs careful scrutiny.
It is interesting that none of our numerical examples lead to universal service cov-
erage by the entrant being socially optimal (or event close to being so). This has been
true for a large variety of parameter settings and suggests that the model may need
modi¯cation to make gains from such provision worthwhile. Thus, for example, within
a model of homogeneous consumer demands, the introduction of network externalities
may help encourage this.
There are a variety of ways in which the paper can be developed. Within the cur-
rent, we might consider endogenous location, price discrimination (say, between the
incumbent's monopolised customers (1¡¹) and those for which it competes (¹®) and
allowing two-part tari®s (see La®ont et al. (1998a)) and more general non-linear tari®
schemes (see Wilson (1993)), all of which can be shown to in°uence the results from
Hotelling's original analysis. Other interesting developments could be introduced to
model particular markets (and issues) more closely. Thus, thinking about telecommu-
nications networks, the introduction of access charges (to be bargained over before,
say, investment in coverage) would allow us to see how the incumbent can use its nego-
tiating strategy to in°uence a potential opponent's scale of entry. On the same theme,
one could examine a dynamic version of this set-up, where the timing as well as the
scale of investment became the focus of attention. This would allow us to compare
privately optimal roll-out speeds with socially optimal ones.
Each of these would shed light on current policy toward the 3G mobile market in
the UK. However, as noted in the Introduction, there are also close analogies with
these issues in the postal sector as it is gradually deregulated. Because it allows for an
17endogenous scale of entry, and a geographical interpretation of coverage, these are be
natural application for our model. Indeed, as governments/regulators continue to seek
ways to encourage competition and entry into formerly monopolised industries, it is
likely that others will emerge. Further, being extensions towards issues in network eco-
nomics, they con¯rm that our model may be fruitful in addressing Armstrong (2001)'s
call for work on investment in such industries; a key issue for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Result 2 Consider the following mixed strategy: Firm 1 plays pM
1 with
probability x and ~ p1 ´ p1(pM
2 ) with probability 1¡x; Firm 2 plays pM
2 with probability
y and pL
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It is straightforward to show that
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Hence Firm 1 chooses x =0o rx = 1 according to y¼1(~ p1;p M
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Similarly for Firm 2, y =0o ry = 1 according to
x R
¼2(~ p1;p L








From (A.1) and (A.2) x¤ and y¤ 2 (0;1): the Nash equilibrium is at (x¤;y¤). QED
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